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Abstract
Consumption volatility relative to output volatility is consistently higher in emerging economies
than in developed economies. One natural explanation is that emerging economies are more likely
to face borrowing constraints and, as a consequence, ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to use international
capital markets to smooth consumption. The author investigates how much this mechanism alone
can account for the relative consumption volatility differential between emerging and developed
economies. His theoretical approach relies on a standard dynamic general-equilibrium model of a
small open endowment economy that is subject to an endogenous borrowing constraint. The
borrowing constraint makes the small economy exactly indifferent between two options: (i)
repaying its external debt, or (ii) defaulting and having to live in ﬁnancial autarky in the future.
The model for the constrained economy is calibrated to match Brazilian data during the period
1980–2001. The author’s ﬁndings suggest that the model is capable of accounting for more than
half of the observed relative consumption volatility differential.
JEL classiﬁcation: F32, F34, F41
Bank classiﬁcation: International topics
Résumé
La volatilité de la consommation, par rapport à celle de la production, est systématiquement plus
élevée dans les économies émergentes que dans les économies développées. Une explication
naturelle de ce phénomène est que les premières sont plus susceptibles de se trouver aux prises
avec des contraintes d’endettement, et qu’elles ont, par conséquent, plus de difﬁcultés à recourir
aux marchés internationaux de capitaux pour lisser la consommation. L’auteur tente de déterminer
dans quelle mesure ce mécanisme peut, à lui seul, expliquer les écarts de volatilité de la
consommation observés entre les économies émergentes et développées. Son approche théorique
est fondée sur un modèle dynamique d’équilibre général standard d’une petite économie ouverte
assujettie à une contrainte d’endettement endogène. La contrainte d’endettement rend
parfaitement indifférent le choix de l’une ou de l’autre des deux options suivantes pour la petite
économie : i) rembourser la dette extérieure; ou ii) faire défaut et se trouver dans l’obligation de
fonctionner en autarcie ﬁnancière dans l’avenir. Le modèle avec contrainte est calibré en fonction
des données de l’économie brésilienne pour la période de 1980 à 2001. Les résultats obtenus par
l’auteur donnent à penser que le modèle est en mesure de rendre compte de plus de la moitié de la
différence observée au titre de la volatilité de la consommation.
Classiﬁcation JEL : F32, F34, F41
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Questions internationales1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the diﬀerences in consumption volatility observed in the
data from emerging and developed small open economies. As a general rule, empirical evidence
from business cycle statistics across countries suggests that economic activity is more volatile in
emerging economies than in developed ones. In particular, the data show that output volatility is
higher in the former than in the latter. Considering that output volatility may be interpreted as
the underlying volatility of the economy, it is not a surprise that most macroeconomic variables,
including private consumption, also tend to be more volatile in emerging economies. However, and
more importantly for the purposes of this paper, standard business cycle statistics show that, even
if one controls for the output volatility, the (relative) volatility of consumption is still higher in
emerging economies than in small open developed economies.
Section 2 of this paper presents empirical evidence of consumption and output volatilities for
two groups of small open economies. For a sample of 24 emerging economies, and 17 small open
developed economies, the volatility of consumption relative to output volatility is, on average, 30 per
cent higher in the emerging economies’ subsample. These ﬁndings are robust to the sample period
as well as to the data frequency, and conﬁrm the results implied by studies containing business cycle
statistics for developed economies (Cooley and Prescott 1995 for the United States; Mendoza 1991
for Canada; and Correia, Neves, and Rebelo 1995 for Portugal) and emerging economies (Mendoza
2001 for Mexico; Neumeyer and Perri 2004, and Aguiar and Gopinath 2004 for Argentina).
It has been shown (Neumeyer and Perri 2004; Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart 1993) that the
excess volatility of business cycles in emerging economies may have a lot to do with a possible
dominant role played by external shocks that aﬀect these economies.1 However, in the context of
a small open economy model, one natural theoretical explanation for the diﬀerences in volatility
is that, perhaps, the two groups of countries, emerging and developed economies, are subject to
diﬀerent external constraints in terms of their ability to borrow in the international capital markets.
The obvious intuition on the relationship between borrowing constraints, including the type of
constraint discussed here, and the volatility of consumption, is that they may limit consumption
smoothing by risk-averse agents and produce a more volatile consumption path.
If, in fact, emerging markets are diﬀerent from developed economies in that they have a lower
ability to use international credit markets to smooth consumption, then the data should reveal
noticeable diﬀerences in consumption volatility in those two groups of countries, as seems to be
the case.2 This empirical evidence has one important implication for the use of theoretical models
1Neumeyer and Perri (2004), using Argentina as a benchmark, stress the important role that shocks to the
idiosyncratic interest rate (international interest rate plus a country risk factor) may play on the business cycle
volatility in emerging economies. Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993), on the other hand, suggest that external
factors, such as macroeconomic variables in the United States, and capital ﬂo w si np a r t i c u l a r ,m a yb ev e r yi m p o r t a n t
to account for macroeconomic developments in Latin America.
2The proposition that access to international capital and credit markets is more restricted for emerging economies
1applied to the study of emerging economies. If one wants to explain the high volatility observed in
their business cycles, particularly in consumption, then this external borrowing constraint has to
be taken into consideration and the typical assumption of unlimited access to perfect world capital
markets, which is implausible in this context, must be abandoned. That is precisely the spirit of
the theoretical model discussed here.
The paper is concerned with answering the following question: how much of the observed
diﬀerences in relative consumption volatility in the data from small open emerging and developed
economies can be accounted for by a borrowing constraint alone?
More speciﬁcally, in order to account for the facts, the paper proposes a dynamic general-
equilibrium model featuring two goods (tradable and non-tradable goods) in an endowment econ-
omy that is subjected to two kinds of imperfections in international capital markets: (i) the lack of
any contingent assets (incomplete markets), and (ii) a ﬁnancial friction that may restrict interna-
tional borrowing. The ﬁnancial friction considered here is an endogenous borrowing constraint in
the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) (see also Kletzer 1984), which has been recently dis-
cussed in the international macroeconomics literature (Arellano 2004; Aguiar and Gopinath 2004).
In their paper, Eaton and Gersovitz are motivated by the apparent paradox of why sovereign gov-
ernments ever choose to repay their debt even when there is no credible enforcement mechanism
in the international markets. Although there is some controversy (Bulow and Rogoﬀ 1989), their
answer to the “paradox” is that the threat of ﬁnancial autarky induces sovereign governments to
make repayments on their foreign debt in order to preserve a “reputation collateral” needed for
future borrowing (see also Cole and Kehoe 1995, 1998; Cole, Dow, and English 1995; Grossman and
Han 1999). Borrower countries know that if they default, lenders will be less willing to lend to them
in the future. The potential exclusion from future borrowing is a cost to a small open economy
populated by risk-averse agents because, in ﬁnancial autarky, their ability to smooth consumption
over time and over diﬀerent states of nature is compromised. Default occurs whenever the present
value of the (instantaneous) beneﬁts of not paying the due services of the external debt outweighs
the (intertemporal) losses in utility that will take place during an autarky state. International
lenders, aware of the potential for debt repudiation, will set in motion a defensive rule to receive
in comparison to, say, OECD countries does not seem very diﬃcult to accept. Although there is no direct evidence
of that, one could mention the lower credit ratings and the higher interest rates paid by emerging economies on their
sovereign debt as indirect evidence that they are more likely to be credit constrained than developed economies.
Events such as the Asian crisis during the late nineties, the frequent balance-of-payments crises experienced by
emerging economies that usually trigger bailouts from the IMF, and their not uncommon decisions to default on their
external debt (the most recent being Argentina’s default in 2002), in a sense, could also be thought of as indirect
evidence that emerging economies are diﬀerent in their access to international capital markets. Not surprisingly,
those events gave enough motivation for a growing literature that deals with the speciﬁcities of emerging markets in
explaining, among other things, how changes in their access to international credit may aﬀect the domestic economies
in various dimensions. This literature includes papers on currency crises (Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz 1995;
Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart 1997; Frenkel and Rose 1996), balance-of-payments crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart
1999; Calvo and Vegh 1999; Edwards 2001), and “sudden stops” (Calvo 1998a,b; Calvo and Reinhart 1999).
2back the full amount of any conceded loans, including interests at the international interest rate, in
all states of nature, and will never lend funds in excess of the level of credit that leaves the borrower
country exactly indiﬀerent between defaulting and fully repaying its debt.
Although some aspects of the more volatile economic ﬂuctuations veriﬁed in emerging economies
have already been studied in the literature on emerging markets’ crises, a systematic attempt to
explain the diﬀerences in relative consumption volatility observed in the data from emerging and
developed small open economies, using a non-ad hoc, endogenous borrowing constraint, has not yet
been done. Using data for 1994Q1−2000Q2 from some emerging and developed countries, Neumeyer
and Perri (2004) present a broader set of facts about business cycle volatility, including information
on relative consumption volatility. They ﬁnd the average relative consumption volatility for their
sample of emerging economies to be 78.2 per cent higher than that of Canada, which is in line with
the evidence presented in section 2 of this paper. However, their explanation for the facts relies
on an exogenous stochastic process for the idiosyncratic international interest rate faced by the
small economy. The exogenous positive shocks on the interest rate could be interpreted as a more
stringent borrowing constraint that imposes additional costs to smoothing consumption through
borrowing in the international capital markets, but the mechanism does not result from optimizing
behaviour on the part of lenders or borrowers.
Mendoza (2001) uses an ad hoc borrowing constraint to explain “sudden stops” in capital ﬂows
to emerging economies. The constraint takes the form of collateral, whereby the country must
commit a constant (exogenous) proportion of its output before contracting any external credits.
Although his model is successful in explaining the abrupt swings in capital inﬂows to the small
emerging economy, it generates an insigniﬁcant diﬀerence in the relative volatility of consumption
between the economies with and without the ﬁnancial constraint.
Borrowing constraints are a way to ration out the amount of credit available to a particular
economy through restriction in quantities. One could also think that, in reality, not only the
quantity of credit is to be directly rationed, but the prices (i.e., the idiosyncratic interest rate
that the country pays on its debt) must impose additional restrictions on the equilibrium amount
of debt. One approach that allows for the interest rate on the external debt to be endogenously
determined, along with the level of debt, in a model with the same kind of borrowing constraint
used in this paper, is pursued by Arellano (2004) and by Aguiar and Gopinath (2004). They
use the same insights that motivated this paper’s endogenous borrowing constraint (in their case,
to generate a positively sloped “supply of debt”), in a model that allows for default to occur in
equilibrium. However, these papers do not discuss how the same model would behave without the
ﬁnancial constraint, nor do they try to explain the potential diﬀerences in the relative consumption
volatility in constrained and unconstrained economies.
Economists have been trying to understand why emerging economies are so vulnerable to all
3sorts of crises, from balance-of-payments’ crises and sudden stops to banking crises and currency
crashes. Although the profession’s explanations about the underlying mechanisms of these events
have improved over the past two decades, no deﬁnitive answer has yet been presented. It is likely
that the road map to a more complete understanding of these phenomena includes a clear identiﬁ-
cation of the particularities, if any, that emerging economies have in comparison with the developed
world. In this sense, because it explicitly proposes an explanation to an important aspect of the
diﬀerences between emerging and developed economies, the paper makes a clear contribution to
the literature on emerging economies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses evidence of the diﬀerences
in output and consumption volatility in small open economies, divided into “emerging” and “de-
veloped” groups. Section 3 presents the theoretical model featuring the endogenous borrowing
constraint. Section 4 discusses the numerical solution of the model, its calibration, and some
simulation results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Consumption Volatility across Countries
Table 1 displays evidence of the higher ratio of consumption volatility to output volatility, at
business cycle frequencies, in emerging economies vis-à-vis small open developed countries. The
table is constructed from quarterly data on real output and real private consumption (as deﬂated
by the consumer price index),3 for 24 emerging economies and 17 small open developed economies.
The sample of countries is selected according to data availability for a relatively long period (ending
in 2001Q4). All data, computed in per capita values at constant 1995 prices, come from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IMF/IFS) dataset, with the exception
of Brazilian and Argentinian data, which come from national sources.4 T h es e r i e sw e r et r a n s f o r m e d
previously to the computation of their second-moment statistics, as follows. First, all the variables
were expressed in logarithms. Second, a seasonal adjustment of the log variables was implemented
using the multiplicative ratio-to-moving-average method. Finally, a smooth trend was subtracted
using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter of 1600 for quarterly data.
3Typically, in the real business cycle literature, statistics on consumption exclude the consumption of durable
goods (since it behaves closely to investment, being more volatile). We could not yet ﬁnd the required information to
do the same here. Probably, for the same reason, Neumeyer and Perri’s (2004) similar empirical exercise considered
only total consumption. A potential problem of this procedure would arise if, for instance, durable consumption
accounts for a higher proportion of the total consumption in emerging economies than in developed countries.
4Argentinian data come from the Dirección Nacional de Cuentas Nacionales (DNCN) and Brazilian data are
collected from the Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (IPEA) at <http://www.ipeadata.gov.br> and from
the Central Bank of Brazil. Both datasets are consistent with IMF/IFS’s data, when they happen to overlap.
4Country σc (%)   σy (%)  σc / σy Data (Start) Country σc (%)   σy (%)  σc / σy Data (Start)
Bulgaria 15.17 12.42 1.221 1994Q1 Austria 2.51 2.05 1.219 1980Q1
Lithuania 6.97 4.20 1.657 1993Q1 Norway 2.38 1.75 1.366 1980Q1
Latvia 6.69 5.09 1.316 1992Q1 UK 1.90 1.56 1.219 1980Q1
Ecuador 6.16 2.45 2.503 1991Q1 Italy 1.50 1.02 1.470 1980Q1
Argentina 5.61 5.34 1.051 1980Q1 Netherlands 1.45 1.14 1.269 1980Q1
Malaysia 5.34 3.52 1.528 1991Q1 Spain 1.42 1.13 1.257 1980Q1
Indonesia 5.22 4.20 1.242 1990Q1 Finland 2.22 2.47 0.898 1980Q1
Turkey 5.14 4.41 1.166 1987Q1 Ireland 1.99 2.01 0.993 1997Q1
Thailand 4.96 4.63 1.071 1993Q1 Sweden 1.86 1.88 0.990 1980Q1
Mexico 4.92 2.66 1.847 1980Q1 Denmark 1.62 1.63 0.992 1987Q1
Brazil 3.86 2.95 1.308 1980Q1 Canada 1.46 2.17 0.671 1980Q1
Croatia 3.52 2.58 1.782 1997Q1 New Zealand 1.38 1.60 0.864 1987Q1
Estonia 3.13 2.74 1.143 1993Q1 Portugal 1.32 1.70 0.780 1988Q1
Slovak Rep. 3.00 1.45 2.061 1993Q1 Australia 1.03 1.46 0.705 1980Q1
Malta 2.81 2.40 1.170 1992Q1 Switzerland 0.99 1.37 0.722 1980Q1
Czech Rep. 2.68 2.45 1.097 1994Q1 France 0.98 1.23 0.905 1980Q1
Hungary 2.64 2.23 1.186 1995Q1 Belgium 0.97 1.37 0.705 1980Q1
South Africa 2.38 1.82 1.310 1980Q1
Colombia 2.34 2.03 1.153 1994Q1
Slovenia 2.12 1.11 1.908 1993Q1
Poland 1.45 1.21 1.203 1995Q1
Peru 6.33 6.38 0.993 1980Q1
South Korea 4.59 4.93 0.931 1980Q1
Phillipines 3.47 3.91 0.888 1981Q1
Emerging 4.60 3.63 1.27 Developed 1.59 1.62 0.98
Table 1
Emerging Economies Small Open Developed Economies
Output and Consumption Volatility: Cross-Country Differences
From Table 1 it seems clear that:
(i) The volatility of the gross domestic product (GDP), denoted as σy in Table 1, is more than
twice as high in emerging economies compared with the developed economies. The averages
are 3.6 per cent and 1.6 per cent, respectively.
(ii) The consumption volatility (σc) is also higher in emerging economies. On average, σc is
almost three times as high in emerging economies. Given the results for the output volatility,
this is not a surprise, since σy may be interpreted as the underlying volatility of the economy,
aﬀecting the volatility of all other variables.
(iii) The relative volatility of consumption tends to be higher than 1 in emerging economies (the
only three exceptions are Peru, South Korea, and the Philippines) and lower than 1 in de-
veloped economies (six exceptions in the sample). The ratio between the average σc and
the average σy is 30 per cent higher in emerging economies in comparison with developed
economies (1.27 against 0.98).
5Table 2 displays the results of four tests of equality of means for X = σc, σy,a n dσc/σy,
between the two groups of countries. Columns 2 and 3 refer to the test of the null hypothesis
H0:mean(Xemerging)=mean(Xdeveloped), against the alternative H1(a):mean(Xemerging) 6=
mean(Xdeveloped), based on the ANOVA F-statistic.5 Columns 4 and 5 also refer to the test
of H0 against H1(a), but using a simple t-statistic. Columns 6 and 7 consider t-tests of H0
against the alternative hypotheses H1(b):mean(Xemerging) >m e a n (Xdeveloped) and H1(c):
mean(Xemerging) <m e a n(Xdeveloped), respectively.
First, consider the test of H0 against H1(a). Note that the null hypothesis of equal means can
be strongly rejected both according to the ANOVA F-test and the two-tailed t-test for all three
variables. Second, regarding the one-tailed t-test of H0 against H1(b), the null is also rejected for
all variables at standard signiﬁcance levels. Finally, the null cannot be rejected in the one-tailed
t-test of H0 against H1(c). The results suggest that the lower absolute and relative volatilities in
emerging economies, as shown in Table 1, are statistically signiﬁcant.
p-value
X Anova F-test H1(a) t-test H1(a) H1(b) H1(c)
σc 19.8493 0.0001 2.0862 0.0435 0.0218 0.9782
σy  12.1626 0.0012 1.9177 0.0625 0.0312 0.9688
σc / σy 10.8192 0.0021 9.4635 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
H0    : mean(Xemerging) = mean(Xdeveloped) 
H1(b): mean(Xemerging) > mean(Xdeveloped) 
H1(c): mean(Xemerging) < mean(Xdeveloped) 
H1(a): mean(Xemerging) ≠ mean(Xdeveloped) 
p-value
Table 2
Test of Equality of Means 
The results shown above are also consistent with those obtained by Neumeyer and Perri (2004).
They use basically the same sample period in a comparison between Argentinian and Canadian
business cycles’ statistics6 and ﬁnd similar qualitative results as those in Table 1. They also compare
Canada with ﬁve emerging countries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and the Philippines)
for the period 1994Q1−2000Q2 and, again, their results are in the same direction.
Table 3 displays the volatilities of output and consumption, as well as their ratio, reported in
Neumeyer and Perri (2004) and in other selected studies. Note that the reported relative volatility
of consumption conﬁrms the higher volatility in small open emerging economies. The information in
5This test is based on a single-factor, between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA). The basic idea is that if
the subgroups have the same mean, then the variability between the sample means (between groups) should be the
same as the variability within any subgroup (within group).
6Although we both use basically the same data, Neumeyer and Perry adjust the series of total consumption to
include government consumption, changes in inventories, and a statistical discrepancy, in order to be consistent with
the only available quarterly data for Argentina previous to 1993. Here, I use the information on annual series for
Argentina to exclude these items from the total consumption previous to 1993, by assuming that the same proportions
observed in annual data are veriﬁed in all quarters of a given year.
6Tables 1, 2, and 3 seems to indicate that the basic result−a higher relative consumption volatility in
emerging economies in comparison with developed economies−is robust to the sample of countries,
frequency of the data, and sample period.
Table 3
Examples of Output and Consumption Volatility Statistics in the Literature
United States σy (%) σc (%) σc/σy Data
Cooley and Prescott (1995) 1.72 1.27 0.74 1954Q1-1991Q1
Small Open Developed Economies σy (%) σc (%) σc/σy Data
Canada: Mendoza (1991) 2.81 2.46 0.88 1945-1985
Portugal: Correia, Neves, and Rebelo (1995) 3.78 3.17 0.84 1958-1991
Canada: Neumeyer and Perri (2004) 1.17 1.02 0.87 1994Q1-2002Q2
Emerging Economies σy (%) σc (%) σc/σy Data
Mexico: Mendoza (2001) 2.73 3.35 1.23 1980Q1-1997Q4
Average of 5 EE: Neumeyer and Perri (2004) 2.94 4.62 1.57 1994Q1-2002Q2
Argentina: Aguiar and Gopinath (2004) 4.08 4.86 1.19 1983Q1-2000Q2
The next section discusses a possible theoretical explanation for this empirical evidence.
3. The Model
In this section, a dynamic general-equilibrium model of a small open economy is presented. The
model departs from traditional small open economy models with perfect capital mobility in that
it allows for the possibility that the economy can choose optimally between defaulting or repaying
its external debt. This feature introduces an endogenous borrowing constraint in the tradition of
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Kletzer (1984).
Consider a small open economy, where a central planner seeks to maximize the lifetime utility of
a representative agent. The agent enjoys utility from a consumption index, ct,w h i c hi sac o m p o s i t e










. There is no production and the
agent receives an endowment of non-tradable goods
¡
Y N¢
, assumed constant for simplicity, and an
endowment of tradable goods, Y T
t = Y T +zt, which randomly ﬂuctuates around the average level,
Y T, according to a stochastic process for the production shock, zt.
7International asset/capital markets are incomplete and no contingent contracts are signed.7 At
the beginning of every period t, the economy inherits a one-period external debt, dt−1,e x p r e s s e d
in units of the tradable good, contracted at t − 1 at the exogenous foreign interest rate, r,a n d
realizes the levels of the endowments. Denote S (dt−1,z t)={dt−1,z t} to be the current state
o ft h ee c o n o m y ,a tt i m et.O n c e S (dt−1,z t) is known, the central planner decides whether the
outstanding debt, including interest services, (1 + r)dt−1, is going to be paid or defaulted. The
central planner’s decision about the full repayment of the external debt is based on the relative
incentives to do so, as follows. The cost of defaulting at time t is to stay out of the international
capital markets from t onwards, renouncing the possibility of using international borrowing to
smooth consumption.8 Implicitly, we are assuming that default against one lender is taken as a
signal by all other international lenders and that they will not only exclude the defaulting country
from borrowing again, but will seize its assets if the country eventually tries to invest any assets
in another international ﬁnancial institution. Given the current state, let V D
t and V R
t be the
indirect utility of defaulting at t (and having to consume the endowments Y N and Y T
t from this
time onwards), or of fully repaying the external debt and continuing to be able to borrow abroad.
Default at time t is chosen by the country whenever V D
t >VR
t .
The international capital market consists of lenders who want to receive back the full amount
of their loans in all possible states of nature. The directive proposed here is to ﬁnd a borrowing
constraint that, at each date and state, will induce the country to participate in the asset market,
instead of defaulting. One could think of the international lenders as a representative international
investor, or an outside foreign agency, that has full information about the domestic economy (for
instance, its current state and the speciﬁcation of the borrower/consumer’s preferences) and the
borrower’s optimization problem. The only role played by the foreign agents is to set up and enforce
the credit limits. Should the sovereign country default on its external debt, the “agency,” or the
pool of investors, would exclude it from intertemporal asset trading forever and, as a result, the
country would be deprived of the risk-sharing opportunities in the future. Aware of potential debt
repudiation, in order to prevent default, the foreign agents will impose a borrowing constraint to
the small economy, by not lending any amount of funds that makes the planner choose default
over repayment. That is, the external investors will set the credit limit such that the borrower’s
expected lifetime utility from participating in the asset market is at least as high as that of staying
7Kehoe and Levine (1993) discuss endogenous borrowing constraints with complete markets. The assumption
of incomplete markets seems to better ﬁt the evidence that countries tend to default during recessions. With the
insurance given by contingent assets, agents tend to leave the credit contract (that is, to default) during “good times,”
when they have to make payments, as opposed to the “bad times,” when they receive the insurance.
8The assumption that countries that default will stay out of the international capital markets forever is clearly at
odds with the evidence that shows many of defaulting countries are able to borrow again after some renegotiation
of their debts. In terms of the model presented in this paper, this assumption means, perhaps, a higher penalty for
defaulting countries than what actually occurs. A standard and simple way of dealing with this issue (Arellano 2004)
is to introduce an exogenous probability of leaving the default state at each period.
8in ﬁnancial autarky, where the country consumes its exogenous endowment output.
If d is the maximal amount of funds that the domestic economy can borrow without triggering
the strategy of optimal default (that is, d is such that V D
t ≤ V R
t ), at every period t, then the
domestic economy is constrained to borrow dt ≤ d. In order to assure repayment in all states of
nature, Zhang’s (1997) approach is adopted by considering the worst-case scenario for the foreign
lenders to deﬁne the critical level of borrowing that triggers default, given the state S (dt−1,zt).





where u(·) is concave, strictly increasing, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable; β ∈ (0,1) is the
subjective discount factor and ct is a consumption index, assumed to be a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) aggregator of the consumption of tradables and non-tradables, with elasticity
of substitution between cT
t and cN
t given by 1/(1 + µ) > 0, and the weight of tradables in the index














The economy is subject to two resource constraints, one for each type of good. For the non-
tradable good, the constraint means that the economy has to consume the endowment:
cN
t = Y N. (3)
In contrast to Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989), this paper accepts the notion that default on the
external debt precludes a sovereign government not only of borrowing internationally, but also
excludes the country from investing its accumulated assets in the international market in the form
of bank accounts, treasury bills, stocks, and other state-contingent assets, without the risk of having
those assets seized by international ﬁnancial institutions or governments. This assumption assures
a support for a positive external debt in equilibrium.9 However, as shown by other empirical
studies that use the same type of borrowing constraint considered here (Arellano 2004; Aguiar
and Gopinath 2004), for reasonable values of the structural parameters on a dynamic general-
equilibrium model applied to a small open economy, the threat of autarky, although capable of
9Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989, 43) have shown that “under fairly general conditions, lending to small countries must
be supported by the direct sanctions available to creditors, and cannot be supported by a country’s reputation for
repayment”; i.e., the penalty of no further borrowing would not deter repudiation and, consequently, a sovereign could
not issue any uncollateralized debt. Bulow and Rogoﬀ’s result depends crucially on the controversial assumption that
repudiation of debt does not mean that the defaulting country is to be cut oﬀ from international capital markets
entirely and may keep on participating as a creditor without fearing that its assets would be seized by foreign ﬁnancial
institutions or governments. However, as Cole and Kehoe (1995, 1998) point out, that result has the counterfactual
implication that the only explanation of why countries do not default is that there are large direct sanctions for doing
so. English (1996) shows historic evidence suggesting that direct sanctions cannot explain why sovereign governments
repay their debts.
9producing a positive amount of debt in equilibrium, cannot generate the levels of debt-to-output
ratio observed in actual indebted economies. For this reason, the model imposes an extra penalty
to the defaulting country, which could be motivated by “the common view that after default there
is a disruption in the countries’ ability to engage international trade, and this reduces the value
of output” (Cole and Kehoe 1998). We assume that, in the case of default, there is an output
loss factor, (1 − λ),f o rλ ∈ [0,1], that corresponds to the negative eﬀects that the default state
causes in the country’s international trade.10 Thus, in case of default, the resource constraint for
the non-tradable good is:
cN
t = λY N. (4)
For the tradable good, the resource constraint, in case of full repayment, means that the economy
keeps the ability to borrow from international lenders, and it is given by:
cT
t = Y T + zt + dt − (1 + r)dt−1. (5)
In case of default, the economy does not have to pay (1 + r)dt−1, but cannot contract dt and
must operate in ﬁnancial autarky from t onwards. The resource constraint then implies that the





Y T + zt
¢
. (6)
The process for the shock zt is assumed to follow a ﬁrst-order Markov chain with transition proba-
bilities given by f (zt|zt−1) and compact support. The ﬁnite support for zt allows the use of Zhang’s
(1997) approach, as mentioned above:
zt ∈ ΩZ =[ zmin,z max]. (7)
The central planner’s problem is to maximize the objective function given by equation (1)
subject to (2)-(7), a standard no-Ponzi-game condition, and to the following borrowing constraint:
dt ≤ d,
where:












The constraint described above represents a way of capturing the widespread notion that bor-
rowers face credit limits in reality and, as such, its use in economic models can mimic important
features of the real world. Borrowing constraints are typically needed to prevent default and
Ponzi schemes (a “natural” borrowing constraint), and to ensure the existence of equilibrium for
10Chuhan and Sturzenegger (2003) ﬁnd that the per cent contraction in output in Latin America, following the
default episodes in the 1990s, was 2 per cent.
10incomplete-markets economies. However, the borrowing constraints used in the literature are often
speciﬁed arbitrarily outside economic models. The borrowing constraints used in most studies take
the form of a lower bound on an investor’s bond holdings, which is a certain percentage of total
income that is independent of the investor’s individual characteristics and income streams that in
reality are important factors in determining the borrowing limit.11
Notice that the borrowing constraint deﬁned above depends not only on the country’s rep-
resentative agent’s characteristics, such as time preference rate, risk aversion, and elasticity of
substitution between the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods, but also on the repre-
sentative agent’s exogenous endowment income stream, here completely determined by the shock
zt. Because the constraint can be interpreted as the borrowing limit such that an investor will not
default and live in autarky, Zhang (1997) refers to it as the “no default borrowing constraint.” In
terms of this paper, it is assumed that emerging economies (given their history and, likely, their
experienced default episodes) face this type of borrowing constraint while developed economies do
not. Although it is not a feature of the model, one could think of “reputation” as an additional
state variable and consider that, at this particular point in time, developed economies have a higher
“stock of reputation” than emerging economies−higher enough to signal a very low propensity to
default.
One can explore the recursive form of the problem. In terms of notation, henceforth the time
subscript t is dropped from the (indirect) utility functions V D, V R,a n dV , which are going to
represent time-invariant value functions. Considering the CES consumption index in (2) and using































Y T + zt + dt − (1 + r)dt−1 ;Y N¢
,
in case of full repayment.
Let zt and dt−1 be in ΩZ and D = {d : dmin ≤ d ≤ dmax}, respectively. Conditional on the state
variables in S (dt−1,z t), and given the Markov process governing the shock, the central planner’s





Y T + zt
¢
;λY N¢
+ βEzV D (zt+1)
11Examples of models with ad hoc borrowing constraints include Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), Telmer (1993), and
Lucas (1994), in the context of using incomplete markets with borrowing constraints in order to resolve the “equity
premium puzzle.” In the international macroeconomics literature, examples of the use of ad hoc borrowing constraints
include Mendoza (2001) and other papers in the “sudden stop” literature, as mentioned in footnote 2.
11in case of default, and as the solution to the following Bellman equation:





Y T + zt + dt − (1 + r)dt−1 ;Y N¢
+ βEzV (dt,z t+1)
ª






= V D (zt)
ª
with V (dt−1,z t)=m a x
©
V R (dt−1,z t),VD (zt)
ª
in case of full repayment.
The solution of the model consists of three objects: (i) a state-contingent optimal decision rule
for the level of next-period debt12 that depends on the current realization of the states, d(dt−1,z t);
(ii) a set of value functions V D (zt), V R (dt−1,z t),a n dV (dt−1,z t); and (iii) the level of the bor-
rowing constraint, d. Given the solution, the underlying probability distribution function of the
production shock, jointly with the decision rule, determines the transition and limiting distributions
of all endogenous variables in the model.
In the empirical application of the model, discussed in the next section, a constant relative







=l o g ( ct) ,i fγ =1
is used, where γ>0 is the (reciprocal) of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution on the
consumption index (or the risk-aversion parameter).
The model also provides implications for the real exchange rate, as measured by the relative
price of non-tradable with respect to tradable goods. In the model, the sectorial (shadow) prices are
represented by the Lagrange multipliers on the respective resource constraints. At the optimum,




















t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the non-tradable and tradable
resource constraints, respectively.
12The decision rule for the dynamic path of dt implies another, c
T (dt−1,z t), for the consumption of tradable goods.
124. Numerical Solution, Calibration, and Simulation Results
Because the model developed in this paper does not have an analytical solution, we explore the
recursive formulation of the central planner’s problem to solve it numerically. We use the value
function iteration method with discretization of the state-space [D × ΩZ], for which, given the
ﬁnite support ΩZ for the shock, the limits dmin and dmax of the set D = {d : dmin ≤ d ≤ dmax} are
appropriately chosen to include the ergodic space.
The algorithm used in the numeric solution is the following. For each iteration j of the algorithm,
given an initial guess for the borrowing constraint, d
(j)
, the model is solved and the value functions
V D(j) (zt) and V R(j) (dt−1,z t) are computed. During this step, every point in the decision rule
d(j) (dt−1,z t) such that d(j) > d
(j)
is replaced by the critical level d
(j)
. After computing V D(j) and









= V D(j) (zt)
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The artiﬁcial economy is calibrated to match some aspects of the Brazilian economy during
the period 1980Q1−2001Q4, when the net external debt (total debt minus international reserves)
averaged θd =2 8 .34 per cent and reached a peak of 47.02 per cent of the GDP,13 which is roughly
equivalent to two standard deviations from the mean. It is assumed that Brazil is an economy
subject to a borrowing constraint like the one discussed in the previous section, and, as such, it
could be used as a benchmark for the simulation exercise.
In order to calibrate the exogenous sectorial outputs, the procedure used here considers the
tradable output share in total GDP observed in Brazil, θT =2 9 .05 per cent, and normalizes the
(deterministic) steady-state values of the tradable output and the relative price of non-tradables
in terms of tradables to be Y T
ss = 100 and pss =1 , respectively. If one sets the average tradable
output to be Y T = Y T
ss, these ﬁgures imply: (i) that the value of the non-tradable output is
Y N = 244.21 and, given a debt-to-output ratio equal to the average value θd, (ii) that the level
of debt (in units of tradable goods) at the steady state is dss =9 7 .56. In order to capture the
potential movements of the simulated series of external debt, an evenly spaced d−grid of 800 points
is constructed from the interval [−100,700], with negative values being assets instead of liabilities.
Roughly, considering the total output at the steady state
¡
Y T + pssY N = 344.23
¢
as reference, the
grid implies debt-to-output ratios in the range [−0.29,2.03].
For the discretization of the z−grid, the Markov chain is set to mimic a ﬁrst-order autoregressive
process of the type zt = ρzt−1 + εt,w i t hεt v N (0,σε), using Tauchen’s (1986) procedure. The
13Actually, these ﬁgures refer to the period 1982Q4−2001Q4, since quarterly data on Brazilian external debt are
not available for the whole period of reference.
13z−grid has ﬁve points, evenly spaced in the interval [−17.11,17.11] with an underlying matrix of






0.3423 0.5984 0.0591 0.0002 0.0000
0.0467 0.5669 0.3744 0.0120 0.0000
0.0016 0.1611 0.6746 0.1611 0.0016
0.0000 0.0120 0.3744 0.5669 0.0467






Table 4 displays the values of the structural parameters used in the calibration exercise. The
value for the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity substitution (or, equivalently, for the CRRA
case, the risk-aversion parameter) is set to γ =1 .5,w h i c hi ss t a n d a r d . 14 The exogenous interest
rate is taken from what the Brazilian government pays in the international capital markets for its
sovereign debt, as represented by the Federative Republic of Brazil’s C bonds. Here, the idiosyn-
cratic interest rate, r, is considered to be the quarterly equivalent of the average real annual rate
on the U.S government bonds (4 per cent per year, using the inﬂation rate on the consumer price
index) plus the average spread paid on the C bonds (803.4 basis points).15 Following the traditional
hypothesis used in the small open economy literature, in order to avoid a unit root in the current
account, the subjective discount factor has to satisfy β (1 + r)=1and, thus, was set to β =0 .9713.
It is worth mentioning that this value of β is consistent with estimations by Issler and Piqueira
(2000) for the Brazilian economy.
The autocorrelation and volatility of the stochastic process of the z production shock is obtained
from an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the Hodrick-Prescott(HP)-detrended output of











and a business cycle component with zero average (the production













is estimated, resulting in ρ =0 .65 and σε =4 .35.16
The output loss in default states, (1 − λ), is calibrated to approximate the average level of
debt-to-output ratio to the actual value (θd =2 8 .34 per cent). Notice that the calibrated value
λ =0 .975, which implies output losses of 2.5 per cent during default states, is not very diﬀerent
from the empirical ﬁndings by Chuhan and Sturzenegger (2003), mentioned in footnote 10.
14For instance, the value used here is the mid-range value of two very common alternatives, γ =1 .001 or γ =2 ,
used by Greenwood, Hercovitz, and Huﬀman (1988) and Mendoza (1991), for example. Issler and Piqueira (2000)
estimate γ =1 .7, using Brazilian data and the same type of utility function used in this paper. The results of the
simulation of the model are virtually the same if one uses this value instead of γ =1 .5.
15For the average foreign real interest rate, the 10-year-maturity U.S. government bond is used, whose maturity
is comparable with that of the C bonds. The average spread for the C bonds refers to the period 1995Q1−2001Q4,
since data are not available before that.
16The estimated parameters (p-values in parentheses) are e k =0 .1240 (0.846), e ρ =0 .6468 (0.000),a n de σε =4 .3499.
14The less-straightforward parameters to calibrate are the weight of tradables in the CES con-
sumption aggregator (ω) and the parameter governing the elasticity of substitution between the
consumption of tradables and non-tradables (µ). Given equation (8) and the calibration procedure
based on the deterministic steady state−at which the external debt-to-output ratio is constant at
the average level, θd, the share of tradable output in total output is θT, and the real exchange
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It should be noticed that, in principle, both parameters are important to the volatility of the
real exchange rate. However, since the business cycle statistics are usually computed on the log
variables, only µ will have an impact on the volatility of (the log of) p. For instance, by taking the







implying that the ratio between the volatilities of (the logs of) pt and cT
t ,a sm e a s u r e db yt h e i r
standard deviations, must be constant and equal to (1 + µ). Because of its eﬀect on the volatility
of p, the parameter µ has an inﬂuence in the volatilities of both total output, Y T
t + ptY N,a n d
total consumption, Ct = cT
t + ptcN.A m o n g t h e d i ﬀerent possible combinations of values for the
two parameters that satisfy the above system of stationary equations, ω =0 .0659 and µ =1 .875
(which implies an elasticity of substitution between cT and cN equal to 0.35) are chosen in order
to match the total output volatility, σy =2 .95 per cent, observed in the data (see Table 1).
17Technically, because of the non-linear nature of the model, which in principle should induce agents to react
asymmetrically to positive and negative shocks, a “deterministic steady state” may not be relevant to reﬂect the
long-run “average” state of the system. Ideally, in this case, a more precise method of calibration should be carried
out through the solution of the whole model for a given set of parameters (all of them), and successive improvements
should be made until the target average values are obtained. However, this non-linearity does not seem to be
important here and the calibration procedure used, based on a deterministic steady state, is able to generate the
target averages quite accurately.
15Table 4
Summary of the Calibration Procedure
Parameter Values Target
1. Risk-aversion γ =1 .5000 Standard
2. Idiosyncratic interest rate r =0 .0295 C bond spread over U.S. bonds
3. Subjective discount factor β =0 .9713 β (1 + r)=1
4. Average tradable output Y T = 100.00 normalization
5. Constant non-tradable output Y N = 244.23 Y T
Y T+pssY N = θT =2 9 .05%
6. Elasticity of substitution between cT and cN µ =1 .8750 σy =2 .95%








8. Autocorrelation for zρ =0 .6468 OLS estimation
9. Std. dev. of the production shock zσ ε =4 .3499 OLS estimation






∼ = θd =2 8 .34%
Table 5 shows the average results of 500 simulations of a time series of size 88,w h i c hi st h e
number of quarterly observations for the 1980Q1−2001Q4 period. The simulated series are trans-
formed according to the same procedure used in the actual data, as discussed in the previous
section. In terms of the model, σc represents the volatility of (the log of) total consumption (in
units of tradable goods) as given by Ct = cT
t +ptcN. Notice that the comparison between the mod-
els for the constrained and unconstrained (perfect capital mobility) economies shows that the type
of borrowing constraint used here has the eﬀect of increasing the relative consumption volatility
from 0.554 to 0.644,a16 per cent increase. Considering that the average ﬁgure implied by the data
from Table 1 is 30 per cent, one could conclude that the borrowing constraint used here is capable
of accounting for 55 per cent of the diﬀerence in relative consumption volatility between emerging
and developed economies.18
Table 5
Brazil - Output and Consumption Volatility Statistics
σy (%) σc (%) σc/σy
Brazil (1980Q1−2001Q4) 2.95 3.90 1.308
Model (constrained) 2.95 1.90 0.644
Model (unconstrained) 2.60 1.44 0.554
Although the model manages to increase the relative consumption volatility, it is not able
to reproduce both the actual absolute and relative levels of consumption volatility, and cannot
18The constrained economy is calibrated for Brazil, rather than for an “average” of emerging economies. However,
the observed values of σc/σy in Brazil and in the average of emerging economies are 1.30 and 1.27, respectively (see
Table 1). At least in terms of the relative volatility of consumption, Brazil can be considered a typical representative
of the group of emerging countries. In addition, as will become clear in the next subsection, the results are quite
robust to a sensitivity analysis that tests diﬀerent calibrations.
16account for the fact that consumption is consistently more volatile than output. Neumeyer and
Perri (2004) attribute this excess volatility of consumption to the dominant role played by interest
rate shocks in these economies. In an economy that faces both income and interest rate volatility,
consumption will be smoother than income if the transitory production shocks are dominant, and
the opposite happens if, instead, the interest rate shocks are dominant. In this model, the absence
of shocks that aﬀect consumption independently of output, such as interest rate shocks, makes it
impossible for consumption to ﬂuctuate more than output. For instance, interest rate shocks aﬀect
the intertemporal decisions of consumption/savings and act on the consumption growth rate, but
have only second-order eﬀects on the production side (in a production economy, ceteris paribus,t h e
main eﬀect would be inducing a substitution of capital by labour). Aguiar and Gopinath (2004)
explain the fact that σc/σy > 1 in emerging economies by adding permanent shocks to the growth
rate of productivity. Since the model is not capable of accounting for the absolute volatility of
consumption observed in the data from emerging economies, other sources of consumption volatility
that should play a major role in emerging economies, while not playing much of a role in developed
economies, are clearly missing here.19
The results of one particular simulation are shown in Figures 1 and 2, for the unﬁltered and
HP-ﬁltered simulated series. Notice that the model is capable of generating a pro-cyclical behaviour
for the consumption series (both tradable consumption and total consumption) as well as for the
real exchange rate, as observed in the actual data from emerging economies (Arellano 2004). Also
notice that the debt series in the constrained economy follows a similar path as in the unconstrained
one, but at a lower level. This feature implies that the borrowing constraint aﬀects the behaviour
of the economy even when it is not binding. In terms of the supply of credits, the simple possibility
of default means less credit to the small economy at all times. From the demand side, agents that
consider the possibility of being credit constrained in the future will save more now (hence, less
debt). The borrowing constraint will bind only when the cost of a bad production shock, in terms
of reducing consumption today, is high enough to induce the agents to borrow until their limit.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the simulated average of the debt-to-output ratio for the
sample is 28.35 per cent in the constrained economy, virtually identical to the actual average
observed in Brazilian data. In addition, the level of the debt limit is such that it corresponds to
80.7 per cent of the simulated average GDP. Notice that this level is well above the maximal level
for the debt-to-output ratio observed in Brazil, in the period 1980Q1−2001Q4 (47.02 per cent).
19These factors tend to be exogenously given. In order to properly assess the eﬀect of the constraint alone, one
w o u l dh a v et oc o n t r o lf o rt h e ma n y w a y .T h er i s ko fn o tc o n s i d e r i n gt h e mi st om i s ss o m ei n t e r a c t i v ee ﬀect between
the exogenous factors and the endogenous borrowing constraint.
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Figure 2: Simulated HP-Filtered Series (Cycle Component) 4.1 Sensitivity analysis
Information displayed in Tables 6, 7a, 8a, and 9a shows how the model for a constrained economy
behaves under diﬀerent values of the structural parameters. The columns in the tables, from left to
right, provide information on the value of the relevant parameter (column 1), on the volatilities of
output and consumption (columns 2 and 3, respectively), their ratio (column 4), the average level
of debt as a percentage of the GDP (column 5), and the credit limit (column 6), both in level and
as a percentage of the GDP (within parentheses). The tables also show the frequency at which
the constraint binds (column 7) and a measure of the explaining power of the model (column 8).
This measure of “success” is given by the proportion of the observed percentage diﬀerence in σc/σy
from the data of emerging and developed economies (that is, the 30 per cent gap between σc/σy =
1.27 in emerging countries, and σc/σy =0 .98 in developed economies) that is accounted for by the
percentage diﬀerence in the relative consumption volatility obtained from the simulated model for
the constrained and unconstrained economies. Tables 7b, 8b, and 9b, in the appendix, show the
results for the unconstrained economy.
Table 6
Constrained Model: Sensitivity to Changes in λ
λσ y (%) σc (%) σc/σy avg d (% GDP) d (% GDP)% bind “success” (%)
0.9725 2.88 1.80 0.625 30.18 300.5 (88.08) 0.22 43.5
*0.9750 2.95 1.90 0.644 28.35 279.5 (80.67) 0.31 55.2
0.9775 3.03 1.99 0.657 26.14 255.4 (73.51) 0.40 62.9
0.9800 3.11 2.10 0.675 23.10 229.4 (65.73) 0.51 74.2
0.9825 3.19 2.20 0.690 19.41 203.4 (57.92) 0.61 83.0
0.9850 3.29 2.32 0.705 15.43 177.4 (50.13) 0.71 92.5
0.9900 3.54 2.64 0.746 5.78 123.3 (34.15) 0.88 117.3
1.0000 4.83 4.12 0.853 -12.53 9.14 ( 2.42) 1.85 182.9
Note: Column 6 shows the borrowing constraint both in level and, inside the parentheses, as a percentage of
the GDP.
(*): this row shows the baseline case.
Table 6 shows how the model for the constrained economy behaves under diﬀerent values of
the parameter λ, which represent the indirect costs of default. The economic principle at work is
based on changes in the cost/beneﬁt of defaulting. Notice that the credit limit d falls (rises) with
increases (decreases) in the value of λ. In order to understand why this happens, one should recall
that a higher (lower) value of λ means that the output losses during default states are less (more)
important, which reduces (increases) the penalty for staying out of international capital markets.
Thus, the higher the parameter λ is, the more likely are the domestic agents to default (because it
costs less), ceteris paribus, and the more likely it is to trigger a defensive response from the external
20creditors, who will have to reduce their maximal level of conceded credits to avoid default. On the
other hand, as λ decreases, it becomes more costly for the country to default and foreign investors
can relax the borrowing constraint without fearing default.
Notice that as λ increases, and the constraint becomes more stringent, both output and con-
sumption become more volatile, although the eﬀect is more important on consumption, since the
ratio σc/σy consistently increases. The intuition behind this result is that a lower credit limit im-
poses additional diﬃculties to risk sharing and consumption smoothing, causing the consumption of
tradables to be more volatile. A more volatile cT
t , in turn, reﬂects on a more volatile real exchange
rate through equation (8).20 Since total consumption is deﬁned as Ct = cT
t +ptcN,t h em o r ev o l a t i l e
consumption of tradables increases total consumption volatility directly and indirectly, through its
eﬀect on pt (the eﬀects cannot cancel each other, since cT
t and pt are positively correlated). The
same is not true for total output Yt = Y T
t +ptY N,w h i c ho n l ys u ﬀers the eﬀect of the more volatile
real exchange rate.
Table 6 also shows that a higher λ induces a lower average level of debt-to-output ratio (which
eventually becomes negative for the extreme value λ =1 .0) and, at the same time, increases the
frequency at which the borrowing constraint binds, suggesting that the eﬀect of an increasing λ is
more important on reducing the credit limit d than on decreasing the domestic agents’ borrowing
motivation. One should expect that, as d is reduced, with incomplete markets, risk-averse agents
would save more (hold less debt), because the risk of being credit constrained in the future is higher
the lower the credit limit is.
Finally, notice that the explanatory power of the model would be improved if a higher value of
λ were used, although the target values for the output volatility and debt-to-output ratio would be
missed.
Table 7a
Constrained Model: Sensitivity to Changes in γ
γσ y (%) σc (%) σc/σy avg d (% GDP) d (% GDP)% bind “success” (%)
0.50 2.95 1.90 0.644 28.58 279.5 (80.70) 0.33 53.7
1.00 2.95 1.90 0.644 28.44 279.5 (80.68) 0.32 53.7
*1.50 2.95 1.90 0.644 28.35 279.5 (80.67) 0.31 55.2
2.00 2.95 1.90 0.644 28.26 279.5 (80.66) 0.30 52.5
2.50 2.96 1.90 0.642 28.17 279.5 (80.65) 0.29 51.1
3.00 2.96 1.90 0.642 28.11 279.5 (80.64) 0.29 51.1
4.00 2.96 1.90 0.642 27.87 279.5 (80.61) 0.26 51.1
Note: Column 6 shows the borrowing constraint both in level and, inside the parentheses, as a percentage of
the GDP.
(*): this row shows the baseline case.
20Throughout the values of λ in Table 6, the volatilities of c
T and p rise monotonically from 0.7 per cent to 1.7 per
cent and from 2.2 per cent to 5 per cent, respectively. This information is not displayed in the tables.
21Table 7a shows that the results obtained for σy and σc in the benchmark (constrained economy)
are relatively robust to changes in the coeﬃcient of risk aversion, γ. In terms of the volatilities,
observe that the results barely change (for σy) or are completely unchanged (σc) from the baseline
case. The absolute value of the constraint, d, is also the same. In addition, in terms of the “success”
of the model in matching the data, no gain is possible by choosing alternative values for γ.T h e r ea r e
a few changes, though. For instance, notice that as γ increases and agents become more risk-averse,
given that markets are incomplete, they tend to save more or, equivalently, hold lower amounts of
debt, since they become too scared of being credit constrained in the future. That explains why
the average level of debt held by domestic agents falls with γ and, given that d remains unchanged,
explains the reduction in the frequency at which the constraint is binding.
On the other hand, one should also expect that more risk-averse agents would be less inclined to
default, ceteris paribus, since they tend to care more about risk sharing, and the cost of defaulting
and being deprived of risk sharing in the future becomes higher. In that case, agents do not want to
default unless they hold a large amount of debt and/or are hit by a bad enough production shock.
Since the cost of default increases for the country, the external investors may relax the credit limit
and still receive back the conceded loans. Conversely, if agents have low risk aversion, then they
do not care very much about risk sharing in the future, which means that not paying back the
debt becomes relatively attractive, forcing the external investors to make the borrowing constraint
more stringent to avoid default. However, for the range of values of γ considered in Table 7a, this
eﬀect is not quantitatively important and the level of d turns out to be constant. In terms of d
as a percentage of the average GDP, the observed reduction is explained as follows. A lower level




≈ Y T − r.avg (d), provided that avg (d) ≈ θd
£
Y T + avg (p)Y N¤
and
(µ,ω) satisfy avg (p) ≈ 1, as is the case. A higher average level of cT combined with an inelastic
(here, constant) level of cN, in turn, means a higher average relative price of non-tradable goods,
p (see equation (8)). The consequence of this appreciation of the real exchange rate is a higher
level of total GDP in units of tradable goods, which explains why the constant level of d falls as
a percentage of the average GDP as γ increases. The fact that the borrowing constraint is not
very sensitive to changes in γ while the average level of debt decreases explains why the borrowing
constraint binds less frequently as γ rises.
Table 8a displays the sensitivity analysis to changes in the weight of the tradable good in
the CES consumption aggregator, ω. One could think of two opposite eﬀects of ω in terms of
the incitation to default. Since a higher ω increases the marginal utility of the consumption of
tradable goods at all times, ﬁrst, there would be higher instantaneous gain from default because,
in that event, the country would be able to consume more of a good (tradables) that has a higher
weight on the consumption index. On the other hand, intertemporally, there would be a higher
22cost of default by the same motive (one could also think that a higher ω makes the agent care
more about risk sharing, since the “insurable” part of the agent’s consumption becomes more
important for their utility). Again, higher beneﬁts of default induce external agents to reduce the
level of maximal credit available to the country and higher costs of default make the constraint less
stringent. Thus, the ﬁrst eﬀect would reduce the level of d,w h i l et h es e c o n de ﬀect would increase
it. Notice that, since the level of d falls (although it increases as a percentage of the GDP because
of a real depreciation that more than proportionally reduces the level of the average GDP in units
of tradable goods) as ω increases, the quantitative relevance of the instantaneous beneﬁts seems to
dominate the intertemporal costs of default.
Table 8a
Constrained Model: Sensitivity to Changes in ω
ωσ y (%) σc (%) σc/σy avg d (% GDP) d (% GDP)% bind “success” (%)
0.0100 1.88 1.71 0.910 6.86 658.0 (36.38) 0.00 0.00
*0.0659 2.95 1.90 0.644 28.35 279.5 (80.67) 0.31 55.2
0.1000 3.42 1.98 0.579 28.63 215.4 (83.22) 0.56 99.2
0.2500 4.35 1.81 0.416 17.35 133.3 (86.04) 0.90 216.7
0.5000 4.97 1.53 0.308 6.27 104.3 (87.88) 0.98 297.4
0.7500 5.27 1.35 0.256 0.76 94.3 (88.69) 1.02 327.3
0.9900 5.44 1.24 0.228 -2.75 89.2 (89.05) 1.03 349.8
Note: Column 6 shows the borrowing constraint both in level and, inside the parentheses, as a percentage of
the GDP.
(*): this row shows the baseline case.
The eﬀects of the constraint are very clear if one compares the sensitivity of the model to changes
in ω in the constrained (Table 8a) and unconstrained (Table 8b, in the appendix) economies. Notice
that, at the very low value ω =0 .01, the two economies are virtually identical, since tradable
consumption has a very small impact on the consumption index and the borrowing constraint is
set at a very high level, as discussed in the previous paragraph. The level of d is high enough to
imply a very low frequency at which the constraint is binding, which makes the two models very
close in behaviour. Numerically, in the simulations, this frequency is zero, for two decimal places,
although it is likely that a high-enough number of simulations would show some cases in which the
constraint binds, since, theoretically, the two models are still diﬀerent.
However, as ω rises, interesting diﬀerences show up regarding the constrained and the uncon-
strained economies. First, notice that the volatility of output departs from 1.88 per cent and rises
in both economies, but it increases more rapidly in the constrained case. The intuition of this
result is the following: since Yt = Y T
t + ptY N, the volatility of output depends on the (exogenous)
volatility of Y T
t , as well as on the (endogenous) volatility of pt and the (also endogenous) covariance





> 0. In the unconstrained economy, the volatility of pt (not shown
in the tables) is almost insensitive to changes in ω (it goes from 1.76 per cent to 1.75 per cent as ω
changes from 0.01 to 0.99), and the volatility of Y T
t is exogenously given. Thus, the only way that





, possibly due to the fact that the
proportion of tradables in total consumption and total GDP increases with ω. In the constrained
economy, on the other hand, on top of the eﬀect described above, the volatility of pt rises (from 1.77
per cent to 3.56 per cent as ω goes from 0.01 to 0.99), rather than stay constant, which explains
the sharper increase in σy veriﬁe di nT a b l e8 ai nc o m p a r i s o nw i t hT a b l e8 b .
The rising volatility of pt in the constrained economy in response to changes in ω, while constant
in the unconstrained economy, is certainly an eﬀect of the borrowing constraint that becomes even
more stringent with increases in ω, and it makes tradable consumption smoothing more diﬃcult.
Not surprisingly, the same happens with the volatility of cT
t (constant at 0.61 per cent in the
unconstrained economy and rising from 0.61 per cent to 1.24 per cent in the constrained economy,
as ω changes in Table 8a). Recall that, since the same standard procedure for business cycle
statistics is being used here (in particular, the variables are treated in logarithmic scale), the ratio
between the volatilities of pt and cT
t has to be equal to (1 + µ)=2 .875.21
As e c o n dd i ﬀerence observed in Tables 8a and 8b, for the constrained and unconstrained
economies, is that the volatilities of total consumption are identical in both economies for ω =0 .01,
but, similar to what happens with σy, they become diﬀerent as ω rises. In the unconstrained econ-
omy, σc falls monotonically with increases in ω, while in the constrained economy there is an initial
phase in which σc rises. In the case of an unconstrained economy, the monotonic fall in σc is purely
mechanical, a consequence of the reduction of the term (1 − ω)/ω. Note that, since Ct = cT
t +ptcN













and, as ω goes from 0 to 1, the term (1 − ω)/ω goes from inﬁnity to zero and the volatility of total
consumption converges (falls) to the volatility of tradable consumption, which does not change
with ω, as discussed above. That is also the reason for the more depreciated real exchange rate
(lower pt) that follows from the increase in ω (see equation (8)). The same eﬀects occur in the
constrained case, with the important diﬀerence that, because the constraint becomes more stringent
w i t har i s i n gv a l u eo fω, tradable consumption volatility increases sharply. The net eﬀect on σc
depends on the relative importance of these direct and indirect eﬀects (through increases in tradable
consumption volatility) induced by a rise in ω. The direct eﬀect makes σc fall, while the indirect













24eﬀect acts in the opposite direction. It seems that the indirect eﬀect dominates for small values of
ω (up to 0.1 in Table 8a) and, as (1 − ω)/ω converges to zero, for higher values of ω, the direct
eﬀect becomes more important and forces σc down.
In terms of the eﬀects of diﬀerent values of ω,aﬁnal diﬀerence between the constrained and
unconstrained economies is the behaviour of the average level of debt-to-output ratio. Since a
higher ω makes tradable consumption more important for the CES consumption aggregator index
and for utility, it makes the representative agent attach more importance to risk sharing at all
times. If markets were complete, this would probably not aﬀect the agent’s total savings, since
there would be complete risk sharing and a reallocation of contingent assets would occur without
important eﬀects on total savings. However, with no contingent assets, agents more concerned
with risk sharing will tend to save more for self-insurance. In fact, in both the constrained and
unconstrained economies, the average level (not shown in Table 8a) of debt falls.
In the unconstrained economy, where there is no risk of a shortage of credits, the average level of
debt falls by 11 per cent (124 to 110.6), but in the constrained economy, where the risk of becoming
credit constrained is real, and increasing with ω, the average level of debt falls from the same 124
as in the unconstrained economy to -2.75, and the agent becomes a net creditor.
In terms of the debt-to-output ratio, in the constrained economy, the fall in the level of debt is
less than proportional to the fall in the value of the GDP for lower values of ω, and the debt-to-
output ratio actually rises. But for ω ≥ 0.1, the higher motivation for savings dominates the real
depreciation, debt falls quicker than GDP, and the opposite occurs. In the unconstrained economy,
since there is no risk of being credit constrained, the fall in debt is smoother and the eﬀects of
the real depreciation on total GDP always dominate, which makes the debt-to-output ratio grow
monotonically with ω.
Table 9a displays the sensitivity of the model to changes in the elasticity of substitution between
cT and cN. The most obvious eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nµ,22 which means that cT and cN tend to work
more as complements than as substitutes, is a rise in the volatility of pt for a given volatility of
tradable consumption, according to equation (8). For a given volatility of tradable consumption, a
lower elasticity of substitution between cT and cN implies a lower percentage variation in cN/cT for
a given percentage change in p, or, alternatively, that a higher proportional change in p is required
for a given change in the consumption of tradable, relative to the consumption of non-tradable,
goods. Notice that, as µ rises, both σy and σc increase as a consequence of the higher volatility of
22The results for µ =1 .0 and µ = −0.25 are particularly important, because they represent a possible alternative
for the calibration procedure, if one wants to consider values of µ close to those implied by the estimates of the
elasticity of substitution between c
T and c
N used in Arellano (2004) and Mendoza and Uribe (1999). Arellano
relies on estimation of the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable consumption for Argentina by
Gonzales-Rosada and Neumeyer (2003), who ﬁnd it to be 0.48, implying µ =1 .0833. Mendoza and Uribe (1999) use
µ = −0.218, the same value as used in Mendoza (1995), which implies an elasticity of substitution of 1.28. Needless
to say, the existence of empirical studies that provide estimations of µ that are lower than the value used in the
baseline case is an important caveat for the results of this paper.
25the real exchange rate. At ﬁrst, for lower values of µ,t h ee ﬀect on σc is stronger than that on σy,
and σc/σy rises, but the inverse occurs after µ ≥ 0.01.23
Table 9a
Constrained Model: Sensitivity to Changes in µ
µσ y (%) σc (%) σc/σy avg d (% GDP) d (% GDP)% bind “success” (%)
-0.750 0.31 0.17 0.548 3.89 641.9 (22.66) 0.00 0.0
-0.250 0.67 0.47 0.701 6.17 641.9 (35.23) 0.00 0.0
0.010 0.86 0.62 0.721 7.81 641.9 (43.93) 0.00 0.0
0.250 1.06 0.75 0.708 9.67 651.9 (54.74) 0.00 0.0
0.500 1.26 0.88 0.698 12.02 670.9 (69.42) 0.00 0.0
1.000 1.73 1.16 0.671 18.18 493.7 (76.35) 0.00 5.0
1.500 2.37 1.53 0.646 25.02 351.6 (78.89) 0.09 23.0
*1.875 2.95 1.90 0.644 28.35 279.5 (80.67) 0.31 55.2
2.000 3.14 2.00 0.637 28.87 260.5 (81.26) 0.37 61.9
3.000 4.39 2.47 0.563 24.35 163.3 (84.91) 0.78 140.9
4.000 5.12 2.37 0.463 14.78 121.3 (87.33) 0.95 222.1
5.000 5.42 2.02 0.373 6.82 102.3 (89.72) 1.02 283.9
Note: Column 6 shows the borrowing constraint both in level and, inside the parentheses, as a percentage of
the GDP.
(*): this row shows the baseline case.
A si nt h ec a s eo fc h a n g e si nω,t h e r ea r et w oe ﬀects caused by variations in µ, one instantaneous
and the other intertemporal. The relative importance of how the changing µ will aﬀect the two
eﬀects will ultimately determine what happens with the level of the borrowing constraint. For
instance, if the two goods are substitutes (low µ), then risk sharing is relatively less important at
all times because, when facing a bad tradable output shock, agents can always substitute away
their tradable consumption for non-tradable consumption. Thus, the instantaneous gain in terms
of a higher tradable consumption in case of default is reduced with reductions in µ. However, since
this substitution is also possible in the future, the intertemporal cost of default is also reduced. The
opposite occurs when µ rises: the instantaneous beneﬁts are higher and, also, the intertemporal
costs of default are higher, since substitutability between the two goods becomes weak and a bad
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26dominates for lower values (µ ≤ 0.5) and, as µ increases, the borrowing constraint, d, becomes less
stringent. For µ ≥ 0.5, on the other hand, the beneﬁts of default increase faster than the costs,
and external investors have to reduce the credit limit to avoid default.
The borrowing constraint as a percentage of the average GDP is monotonically increasing with
µ, even when the borrowing constraint becomes more stringent. Again, the reason for this is a
sharp real depreciation that follows the increase in µ, which causes the GDP in units of tradable
goods to fall more than proportionally to the fall in d. This real depreciation is a consequence
of the fact that non-tradable consumption is constant in equilibrium and the two goods tend to
become complements, as µ increases. With low values of µ and higher substitution between the
two goods, given that non-tradable output and consumption are constant, the relative scarcity of
tradable goods is reduced, which requires a lower price of tradables relative to non-tradables (that
is, p has to rise); the opposite (i.e., real depreciation; a fall in p) happens for high values of µ.
As the value of µ rises, the level of the average debt increases initially and falls afterwards
(this information is not displayed in Table 9a). For µ ≤ 1.0, the debt level rises by 6.2 per cent
(from 110.7 to 117.6)a sµ goes from −0.75 to 1.0. For values of µ that are higher than 1.0,t h e
level of debt falls by 93.3 per cent (from 117.6 to 7.9)a sµ goes from 1.0 to 5.0. This result is a
consequence of the eﬀect that µ has on the borrowing constraint, d.W h i l eµ is still low, and the
borrowing constraint becomes less stringent as µ rises, agents that are risk-averse and fear being
credit constrained will save less, because d is too high. Actually, this explains why the constraint
does not bind at low values of µ and, also, why the constrained and unconstrained economies are
virtually the same for values of µ that are lower than 1.0 (the constraint is so loose that, numerically,
the two economies behave almost the same). However, as µ increases and the constraint becomes
more stringent, the risk of being credit constrained increases and agents will tend to start saving
more, reducing their debt.
In terms of the debt-to-output ratio, the initial increase is due both to the rise in the average
level of debt and to the reduction in the value of total GDP in units of tradables that follows the
real depreciation. The fall observed for µ ≥ 2.0 is explained by the fact that the level of debt
decreases more than proportionally to the fall in the value of GDP.
275. Conclusion
This paper presented empirical evidence of higher relative consumption volatility (to output
volatility) experienced by emerging economies compared with developed small open economies.
The data indicate that emerging economies have 30 per cent more relative consumption volatil-
ity than small open developed economies, and this diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. Using a
dynamic-general equilibrium model of an endowment, two-goods, small open economy subject to
an endogenous borrowing constraint, the paper suggests that the constraint alone, although having
limited explanatory power on the relative consumption volatility diﬀerential, is able to increase the
relative consumption volatility by 16.3 per cent, which corresponds to more than 55 per cent of
the gap observed in the data from emerging (likely to be constrained) and small developed open
economies.
The model does relatively well, quantitatively, in explaining the empirical evidence discussed
here and, qualitatively, in a number of dimensions such as the pro-cyclical movements of consump-
tion and the real exchange rate, as mentioned in the previous section. However, the model does
not perform well in other aspects. For example, it is not able to reproduce actual levels of absolute
output and consumption volatilities, nor is it capable of explaining the fact that consumption is
consistently more volatile than output in emerging economies. Also, since there is no investment
or production in the model, any positive production shock translates into an amelioration of the
current account, since only the consumption-smoothing mechanism is at work and the investment
motive does not exist. Future extensions of this paper intend to address those matters.
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31Appendix
Tables 7b, 8b, and 9b display information about the sensitivity analysis of the model for the
unconstrained economy.
Table 7b
Unconstrained Model: Sensitivity to Changes in γ
γσ y (%) σc (%) σc/σy avg d (% GDP)
0.50 2.59 1.44 0.556 34.95
1.00 2.59 1.44 0.556 34.93
*1.50 2.60 1.44 0.554 34.91
2.00 2.60 1.45 0.558 34.89
2.50 2.60 1.45 0.558 34.88
3.00 2.60 1.45 0.558 34.87
4.00 2.60 1.45 0.558 34.83
Table 8b
Unconstrained Model: Sensitivity to Changes in ω
ωσ y (%) σc (%) σc/σy avg d (% GDP)
0.0100 1.88 1.71 0.910 6.86
*0.0659 2.60 1.44 0.554 34.91
0.1000 2.97 1.33 0.448 46.51
0.2500 4.02 1.02 0.254 75.75
0.5000 4.82 0.79 0.164 95.86
0.7500 5.22 0.68 0.130 105.22
0.9900 5.44 0.61 0.112 110.41
Table 9b
Unconstrained Model: Sensitivity to Changes in µ
µσ y (%) σc (%) σc/σy avg d (% GDP)
-0.750 0.31 0.17 0.548 3.89
-0.250 0.66 0.47 0.712 6.17
0.010 0.86 0.62 0.721 7.81
0.250 1.06 0.75 0.708 9.67
0.500 1.26 0.88 0.698 12.02
1.000 1.71 1.13 0.661 18.27
1.500 2.20 1.33 0.605 26.86
*1.875 2.60 1.44 0.554 34.91
2.000 2.73 1.47 0.539 37.86
3.000 3.80 1.51 0.397 63.92
4.000 4.65 1.30 0.280 86.65
5.000 5.13 1.04 0.203 100.37
(*): this row shows the baseline case.
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